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Abstract
This paper presents a negotiation model that includes value creation. It shows that creative negotiation efforts
tend to intensify toward the deadline, and that the deadline is determined endogenously by the tension between
two motives, creating more value and claiming from existing value. When the parties can present “misleading”
offers in order to claim rather than create value, the outcome in early negotiation rounds may display an impasse
where any proposal is rejected without inspection, while negotiation activities such as value creation through
“sincere” offers and inspection of clauses intensify toward the deadline.
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1. Introduction
The parties to a negotiation often create joint value by devoting time and resources to bring
into surface mutually beneficial deals, create an atmosphere conducive for making deals,
exploit areas that promise a value and possibly identify a corresponding exchange of con-
cessions by mixing and matching issues. Even in the small-scale negotiations between a
contractor and a client, value is not all given but created by gathering and transmitting
information (about outside opportunities, the client’s preferences over various attributes
of the house and the contractor’s cost of supplying these attributes), discussing and exploring
possible structures given the topology of the land, and making proposals about the clauses
to safeguard the parties against opportunistic behavior. These activities are perhaps more
obvious in large-scale negotiations reported in popular press; consider the enormous amount
of research and creative efforts involved in the process leading to the conclusion of the North
American Free Trade Agreement.1
This paper focuses on the early stages of negotiation, those in which the parties “con-
struct the pie”. It presents a multi-round negotiation model that incorporates both value-
creation and value-claiming aspects, which is therefore quite different in style from standard
bargaining models.2 In each round of the basic model, the players decide noncooperatively
on their value-creating efforts. These efforts represent activities that aim at pressing out
toward the Pareto Frontier, searching for and exploring mutually beneficial terms of ex-
change and/or concessions, possibly bringing in additional issues to the negotiation table.
The created value accumulates from one round to the next, and is shared at the end of the
last negotiation round, when the agreement is concluded and implemented. To keep the focus
on the process of value creation, I assume that the parties share efficiently and symmetri-
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cally the joint value that emerges from negotiations. I use this basic framework to address
the following questions: What determines the length of the negotiation process, that is, for
how many rounds will the parties keep constructing a pie? And how do incentives to cre-
ate value evolve during this process? Do the parties create more value in later or in earlier
rounds?3
Regarding the second question, the paper identifies a deadline effect: the parties’ efforts
intensify and the incremental value they create grows toward the end of negotiations. This
is due to the fact that the costs and benefits of negotiation efforts are not synchronized.
Given exactly the same value creation technology in each round, negotiation efforts are
incurred during the process while the benefits are obtained only after the final round. In
many cases of multi-round negotiations, the last rounds in fact seem to be more productive
than earlier rounds. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the efforts and/or
the information revealed in earlier rounds prepare the ground for (increase the productiv-
ity of efforts in) later rounds of negotiations. The deadline effect provides an entirely dif-
ferent explanation.4
The question regarding the length of the negotiation process is addressed in Section 4
where the number of rounds is endogenized by extending the parties’ strategies to include
a binary continuation/termination decision at the end of each round. Continuation for an-
other round creates more value for future sharing, while termination yields the shares from
the value created thus far. The discount factor (time preferences and/or the exogeneous
probability of a breakdown) and the tension between two motives, continuation and termi-
nation to claim value, determines the maximum length of the process. A given number of
negotiation rounds, say, two, arise as the most lengthy subgame-perfect equilibrium nego-
tiation outcome for a specific intermediate range of discount factors. This result establishes
a nice correspondence between the length of negotiations and the players’ time preferences
and/or the probability of an exogenous breakdown.
In Section 5, I combine the basic model with Rasmussen’s (1994) model to investigate
several other aspects of negotiations. The extended model allows for two types of clause
offers (sincere and misleading), which can be rejected outright, inspected or accepted. A
misleading clause is a suggested deal on the basis of manipulated or concealed informa-
tion.5 Unlike Rasmussen’s model, the negotiation efforts, hence the resulting value, are
determined endogenously when a (sincere) clause offer is not rejected outright. Given the
same value-creation technology in both rounds through sincere clause offers, the analysis
focuses on whether misleading offers, inspections, outright rejections and value creation
are more likely in first or second round negotiations. I show that when inspection costs are
not prohibitive and there is an incentive to offer misleading clauses in both rounds, the
undominated equilibrium involves mixed strategies where the probability of a misleading
offer declines, along with the probability of inspection, from round one to round two. The
intuition for this result is rooted in the deadline effect and the evolution (from round one to
round two) of the expected discounted payoffs from offering a sincere and a misleading
clause. I characterize the equilibria of this game. There are equilibria in which no value is
created with probability one in the first round while some value is created in round two
with positive probability. However, there are no undominated equilibria in which first-round
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negotiations are more likely to generate value. The second-round outcome in general dis-
plays relatively intensive negotiation activities such as inspection, value creation and sin-
cere clause offers.
2. A basic negotiation model with value creation
Consider two players, a proposer “P” and an accepter “A”. Suppose these players have al-
ready agreed on a basic contract that generates a value normalized to zero; they are now
facing n rounds of negotiations to improve upon the basic contract. The proposer offers a
clause in each round.6 A potential value is associated with each clause offered, but the value





i is thus an individual cost representing player i’s value-creating activities during nego-









that the players know the function s(., .), called the value technology.7
The created value accumulates from one round to the next, and is shared at the end of
round n. Thus, the benefits from creating value are obtained when the agreement is con-
cluded and implemented, while the costs of negotiation efforts are incurred in the corre-
sponding round. To keep the focus on the value-creation aspect, I choose not to model
explicitly the process whereby the players’ shares from the created value are determined.
I assume that total created value is shared equally.8
The players have a common discount factor δ ∈ (0,1). The following interpretations of
δ are quite useful: δ can be written as e–r∆ where r is the personal rate of time preference
and ∆ is the length of a negotiation round. The discount factor increases as r and/or ∆ de-
creases. Perhaps a more interesting interpretation in the context of negotiations is that δ
can be thought of as the probability of proceeding from round t to round t + 1. Thus, 1 – δ
can be interpreted as the probability of an exogenous breakdown, for instance, of a chance
that industry conditions, rival offers, government regulations, or an unexpected turn of
events, etc. will change and/or kill the deal.
If P’s clause offers are negotiated with efforts x
t
i, A’s discounted payoff from n rounds
of negotiations is9
n       s(xt
P, xt
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A in the effort costs. I assume the following about the value technology.
Assumption 1 s(xP, xA) is strictly concave, symmetric, and increasing in both arguments,
with ∂ s/∂ xi → ∞ as xi → 0 and s(0, x) = s(x, 0) = 0 for all ≥ 0.
This assumption simply states that more negotiation effort creates a larger joint value and
that each player’s effort is indispensable to conclude a deal with positive value. Note that
round-t negotiation efforts have no impact on round-(t + 1) value-creation technology, nor
does the value created in one round affect the possibilities to create value in another round.
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Supplying the negotiation effort to create the value implicit in a clause on the negotia-
tion table must be in the self interest of each player. Thus, for instance, in the final negotia-
tion round A’s effort xA should maximize s(xP, x)/2–x given xP, and similarly for xP. Since
the value technology s(., .) is symmetric, the unique Nash equilibrium with positive efforts,
hence the unique pair of self-enforcing effort levels, are also symmetric. Below I present
an implication of this basic model, about the evolution of creative negotiation efforts.
3. The deadline effect
The presence of a deadline or a commonly expected date at which an agreement will be
concluded affects the process of negotiations. Zartman and Berman (1982) point out one
reason why the late rounds often display intensified negotiation activities and are relatively
productive: Given the expected value associated with a prospective agreement and the pres-
sure of time, the parties find it worthwhile exerting a final conclusive effort on unresolved
issues and build up on what has been achieved in earlier rounds. This argument seems to
be based on a war-of-attrition conception of negotiations where the expected benefits from
holding out for a concession from the other side diminish, and thus both players end up
making concessions, as the deadline approaches.10 The present model provides a different
explanation, based on the fact that potential individual costs and benefits are not synchro-
nized.







) will be created and shared at the end of round n. In each round t of this symmetric equi-
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*) – x].11 This equilibrium
condition implies the following result.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium negotiation efforts are increasing over time: x*
t
  < x*
t+1
. The
smaller the discount factor δ, or the larger the probability of a breakdown, the steeper is
the pattern of negotiation efforts.
The proof follows from the parties’ payoff expressions and SPE conditions. For example,
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. Efforts to create value intensify as the parties approach the termina-
tion date. I call this phenomenon the deadline effect.12 Since the game is strongly symmet-
ric and value creation opportunities are identical in both rounds, the deadline effect is a
consequence of the interaction between time preferences, the probability of a breakdown,
and the fact that private benefits and costs of negotiation are not synchronized. A larger
probability of breakdown generates a steeper pattern of creative negotiation efforts, invit-
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ing more prudence in the early rounds while shifting efforts toward the end of a fixed-term
negotiation process, where the probability that the gains from an agreement materialize is
close to one. The next section shows that the deadline effect is not an artifact of the as-
sumption that the number of rounds is exogenously fixed and provides an upper bound on
the length of the negotiation game.
4. Endogenizing the deadline
An obvious constraint that keeps the parties from continually negotiating is a pre-speci-
fied enforceable deadline. An upper bound on the potential value associated with the finite
number of issues on the negotiation table also generates a constraint. Once this value is
created and shared, potential benefits from extending negotiations will be exhausted. In
this section I provide another constraint that stems from the interplay of the discount fac-
tor (with the interpretations given above) and the conflict between pursuing negotiations
to create more value and terminating to enjoy the value created so far. This constraint is
different from the one generated by a bounded potential value because value-creation op-
portunities in this model are identical across the rounds, and the number of rounds is
endogenized, hence potentially infinite. The constraint arises as a SPE outcome, hence, is
self-enforcing.
The parties’ strategies now include a binary continuation decision ρ
t
i ∈ {0, 1} where ρ
t
i
= 1 is a message that party i sends to the other at the end of round t, communicating his
wish to extend negotiations for another round. Negotiations will continue for another round
if and only if ρ
t
A = 1 and ρ
t
P = 1. Formally, a history h
t
 of the negotiation game at the end of











. Strategies in this extended game are defined as follows: Letting
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× {0, 1} → R
+
, i = A, P. The SPE that displays the longest, uninterrupted
negotiation process and thus the largest value is called the Most Lengthy SPE (MLSPE).
The n-round SPE is the MLSPE if it is impossible to construct an (n + t)-round SPE. It is
uninterrupted if a positive value is created in each round t ≤ n along the SPE path. I make
a tie-breaking assumption according to which if in round t a player obtains the same pay-
off from termination and continuation, then he terminates by setting ρ
t=0
. The MLSPE pro-
vides an upper bound prediction on the length of uninterrupted negotiations.
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A discount factor not too low ensures that an n-round negotiation outcome is an equilib-
rium, and a discount factor not too high ensures that the most lengthy negotiation outcome
is not more than n rounds. The analysis can be pursed further to investigate the efficient
length of negotiations (subject to the constraint that negotiation efforts are determined
noncooperatively). The (constrained) efficient number of negotiation rounds can be found
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by comparing the payoffs from SPEs of differential durations. Obviously, the number of
rounds in the MLSPE need not be efficient; the most lengthy SPE may be too lengthy.
5. Negotiating under imperfect information about intentions
This section adds more structure into the basic model with two rounds. I drop the con-
tinuation/termination decisions but, following Rasmussen (1994), extend the strategies
to include the possibilities of misleading offers and inspections of clause offers. This
extension captures important aspects of negotiations, such as the parties’ attempts to
mislead the other side and conclude a deal on the basis of manipulated or concealed in-
formation, often a tempting option that promises to win a valuable edge. For example, to
get low tax rates a foreign mining company may try to persuade local authorities about
how modest profits will be, hiding, on the other hand, the full environmental impact of
the project. Ignorance can be exploited by adding a supposedly meaningless “standard”
clause that reverses the thrust of an agreement. The lure of these tactics is individual gain,
victimizing the opponent and the joint value that would otherwise be created. As a safe-
guard, the parties may engage in costly inspection of proposals. In the example given
above, the host country may bring environmental experts to the negotiation table, have
the potential environmental aspects of the project inspected, thus devote time and re-
sources, if the mining company seems likely to conceal these aspects to its own advan-
tage. Costly clause inspection activities and incentives to mislead the other side may
generate an impasse.13
To incorporate these ideas, the model is extended to include the following sequence of
events. A “sincere” clause generates value when it is supplemented by negotiation efforts,
whereas a “misleading” clause can generate no value. In each round, first, the proposer P
decides on the type of clause he offers, “sincere” or “misleading”. The accepter A does not
know the type of the clause he is offered but he can inspect to learn this at a private cost c
before negotiating. Besides inspecting and trusting to negotiate without inspection, A has
a third choice, of rejecting the offer on the spot, without inspection. If A inspects and finds
that the offer is “sincere” or if he trusts P and does not reject nor inspect the clause, the
parties proceed to negotiations and determine their value-creating efforts. When an agree-
ment based on a misleading clause is concluded, A incurs a loss L and P captures a private
benefit M at the end of round two.14 An agreement based on a sincere clause and negoti-
ated with efforts x
t
i generates the value s(xP, xA).
This extended model is analyzed below to derive the likely evolution of negotiation
activities from round one to round two. Is A more likely to inspect, or negotiate without
inspection, in the first or second round? Is P more likely to make a sincere offer in the first
or the second round? As shown below, the answers to these questions depend on c, L and
M, but more crucially on the evolution of potential discounted benefits and costs associ-
ated with the parties’ options.15
The game has equilibria that display an impasse in both rounds due to the possibility of
misleading behavior and a justified lack of trust, despite the existence of mutually benefi-
cial outcomes and a nonprohibitive inspection cost. However, the deadline effect also plays
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a role and generates a more favorable expectation about the outcome of second-round ne-
gotiations, with intensified activities of value creation and clause inspection.
Let µ
t
 ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that P offers a sincere clause in round t = 1, 2. Also,
let σ
t
 ∈ [0, 1] and α
t
 ∈ [0, 1] denote respectively A’s mixed strategy to inspect and accept




 is the probability that A rejects the clause
outright and does not negotiate in round t. Recall that A also rejects the clause if he finds
that it is misleading after inspection. His expected discounted payoff corresponding to
round-one negotiations is
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In (1), the expression following σ
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 is the payoff from inspection, and the one following α
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from negotiating and accepting without inspection. The latter option yields A a higher pay-
off than outright rejection if µ
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*/δ], that is, if P is sufficiently likely
to offer a sincere clause. Thus, incorporating this choice of A, his first-round expected payoff
becomes
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        That is, if P is unlikely to offer a sincere clause, A sets α
1
 = 0 because negotiating and con-
cluding a deal is strictly dominated for A. A’s relevant payoff viewed from the beginning
of the second round is also as given in (1), except that δ = 1 and the subscripts change ac-




*) by the deadline effect, and that
no value is created if A rejects the clause. The expression of P’s payoff corresponding to
first round negotiations is
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        I focus on the undominated SPE, characterized in Proposition 3, and rule out “sunspot-like”

















* denote the net discounted payoffs from creating value in periods one and




. The equilibrium outcome in each round depends mainly on two
conditions. The first condition compares the inspection cost c with the discounted cost of
accepting a misleading clause (δ L in the first round, L in the second). The second condi-
tion compares P’s discounted payoff (δ M in the first round, M in the second) from an
accepted misleading clause with the discounted payoff from offering a sincere clause that
builds up value (δ X
1
 in the first round, X
2
 in the second). The first condition determines
whether A’s option of inspection is dominated or not, the second condition determines
whether P has an incentive to offer a misleading clause. In the case δ M ≤ δ X
1
, offering a
sincere clause is P’s dominating strategy in both rounds, therefore the equilibrium value-
creation efforts follow the path described in the discussion of Proposition 1. I confine the




Proposition 3 Assume M > X
1
. Undominated SPE of the two-round negotiation game with
imperfect information about clause types are as follows.
(i) If c < d L, in both rounds inspection dominates negotiating without inspection.
In the case X
1
 < M < X
2




* = 1. In round one, it is
given by
In the case X
2
 < M, µ
1
*, α1* and σ1* are as above, while the second round equilibrium is
(ii) If δL ≤ c < L, inspection dominates negotiating without inspection in the second round.
The equilibrium strategies in the second round are as described in case (i) above. The




* = δ1* = 0.
(iii) If L < c, the expected type of the clause determines whether inspection dominates





* = σ1* = 0 as in case (ii), while the second-round equilibrium is µ2* = α2* = 1 if X1








* = 0 if X
2
 < M.
I relegate the proof to the Appendix and explain below the equilibria in Proposition 3. Note
that inspection costs do not matter when A can trust P. They matter only otherwise, when P
has an incentive to offer a misleading clause (the case M > X
1
 in round one, and the case M
> X
2
 in round two).
There exists an intermediate range of M (larger than X
1
 but smaller than X
2
) where P has
an incentive to offer a misleading clause only in round one. This range exists because P’s
discounted benefit from offering a misleading clause grows slower (from δ M in the first
round to M in the second round) than does his potential benefit from offering a sincere clause
(from δ X
1
 in round one to X
2
 in round two). For M in this range, the second round outcome





*). The outcome of the first round will be affected, as follows. If, in addition, c > δ
L, i.e., if A’s inspection cost is larger than the discounted cost of accepting a misleading
clause, the unique first-round equilibrium displays an impasse: A does not trust P and re-
jects the first-round offer without inspecting it. If the inspection cost c is lower than δ L, so
that it may be worth inspecting the clause in round one, Proposition 3 case (i) stipulates
that the relative positions of L/[L + X
1
] and 1 – c/δ L play the crucial role. The first expres-
sion is a measure of the cost of accepting a clause of unknown type. The closer it is to one,
the larger is A’s potential cost of negotiating without inspection. The second expression
can be viewed as a measure of the benefit of inspection. The closer is 1 – c/δ L to one, the
   c X
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more attractive is inspection relative to negotiating without inspection, given a probability
µ
1
 of receiving a sincere offer. If L/[L + X
1
] is larger than 1 – c/δ L, there is no range of µ
1
such that the relative benefits of inspection exceed costs. This implies that, given P’s in-
centive to offer a misleading clause in round one, A does not trust P and rejects the clause
with probability one. The larger is L, and the larger is the inspection cost c relative to L, the
more likely is an impasse in the first round. On the other hand, if L/[L + X
1
] < 1 – c/δ L, a
mixed strategy equilibrium exists in round one, generating a random outcome which may
involve inspection or acceptance (but never outright rejection) by A, combined with a
misleading or sincere clause offer by P. This equilibrium, which arises because A can now
beneficially protect himself through inspection, is obviously better than an impasse. Given
the choice, P would also like to negotiate with an A who can inspect at a low cost and there-
fore protect himself against P’s opportunism.
The equilibria in the case where P has an incentive to offer a misleading clause in both
rounds can be explained in light of the arguments presented above. Now, M > X
2
, hence
also M > X
1
. If the inspection cost is prohibitive, that is, c > L, hence also c > δ L, no value
is created in two rounds despite existence of mutually beneficial agreements. For an inter-
mediate range of inspection costs (δ L < c < L) no value is created in the first round, but the
second-round equilibrium outcome may involve mixed strategies and some value may be
created with positive probability. Comparing the equilibria for different ranges of c sug-
gests that low values of c can significantly improve the negotiators’ welfare by switching
the equilibrium to a more efficient one.
The game has a rich class of potential outcomes when inspection costs are relatively
low (c < δ L) and P has an incentive to offer a misleading clause in each round. Then, ei-
ther no value is created with probability one, or the equilibrium outcome is random, in-
volving mixed strategies. This makes four potential types of equilibria, according to whether
the corresponding strategies in each round are mixed or pure. I show below that one of these
potential equilibria can be ruled out. With probability one, the players create no value in
the first round if
    L     c
            > 1 –     , (4)
 
 L + X
1
    δL
and with probability one no value is created in the second round if
    L     c
            > 1 – (5)
 
 L + X
2
     L
Note that (4) is implied by (5), which means that if the equilibrium in the second round
displays an impasse (zero value creation with probability one), then the first round equi-
librium outcome also displays an impasse. Thus, when inspection is relatively easy, (c < δ
L) and P has an incentive to offer misleading clauses in both rounds, either (i) the negotia-
tion process creates no value ((4) and (5) hold), or (ii) some value is created with positive
probability in only the second round ((4) holds but (5) fails), or, finally (iii) the outcome in
both rounds is random ((4) and (5) fail together). The following conclusion can be distilled
from the analysis.
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Proposition 4 Under imperfect information about clause types, negotiation activities such
as clause acceptances, sincere clause offers and value creation are likely to intensify to-
ward the deadline.
The two-round negotiation game has no undominated equilibria in which the probability
of acceptance is larger in the first than the second round, nor does it have an equilibrium in
which the probability of outright rejection is larger in the second round. When sincere clauses
are offered and accepted in both rounds, a larger value is created in the second round than
the first. Thus, the analysis of this fixed-round model confirms the observation that the
negotiators become more active in late negotiation rounds. The extended model with con-
tinuation/termination decisions and endogenous number of rounds would further strengthen
this result. Whatever the number of rounds involved in a MLSPE, the last round equilib-
rium will be identical to the second-round equilibrium if the fixed-round model, and the
equilibrium in the round before the last will be identical to the first-round equilibrium pre-
sented above.
6. Concluding remarks
This paper presents a model that incorporates creation of value during a negotiation and
investigates the dynamics of negotiation activities, intensity of value-creating efforts,  like-
lihood of rent-seeking misleading proposals, inspections, and rejections of proposals. It
identifies a deadline effect regarding the evolution of efforts to create value in negotiations:
incentives to create value are enhanced as negotiations advance. The deadline effect is a
testable proposition and should be at work in real-life negotiations. It stems from the fact
that individual costs and benefits of negotiating are not synchronized. Because the costs
are spread over the entire process while the benefits come at the end, negotiation activities
intensify as the probability of an exogenous breakdown naturally decreases, toward the
deadline. The basic model is extended to endogenize the deadline by including in the play-
ers’ strategies a binary continuation/termination decision. This decision is shown to be
shaped by the tension between value creation and value claiming: negotiating another round
to create more value versus terminating the process to enjoy the shares from the existing
value.
The parties to a negotiation can adopt sincere and misleading types of actions, but their
intentions to create or claim value are in general private knowledge. As one party is ex-
pending creative effort to press out toward the Pareto frontier, the other may try to take
advantage of his private information and knowledge by misleading to conclude a deal which
ex-post will turn out to be bad for his opponent. Negotiators, or their lawyers, may inspect
the deal they are offered in order to learn the intentions of their opponent. I study the dy-
namic consequences of imperfect information about intentions in Section 5 and confirm in
the two-round model a phenomenon that can be shown in a multi-period version, namely,
that the early rounds of negotiations have a tendency to be negatively affected by imper-
fect information about intentions. The deadline effect plays a role in this result. The rela-
tively small opportunity cost of making misleading proposals increases the probability of
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an impasse in early negotiation rounds. In such an outcome the players do not trust each
other and reject any proposal without inspecting and negotiating. The analysis highlights
the roles of inspection costs and of the private benefits and costs associated with making
and accepting misleading proposals. In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, which exists when
inspection costs are relatively low and there is an incentive to make a misleading proposal,
inspections and misleading proposals occur less frequently over time, as the negotiators
approach the deadline.
An interesting question that should be addressed in future research is the ordering of
issues in a negotiation agenda. A small number of papers address this question in a pure
bargaining framework where the value associated with each issue is exogenously given.17
The parties to a negotiation have prior beliefs about what set of issues promises the largest
joint and/or individual values, and they start exploring, discussing and creating value on
the basis of these priors. Should they begin with exploring the issues that promise a rela-
tively small or large value? And how do signaling considerations affect the answer? Intui-
tion suggests that the issues promising a large value should be negotiated in the round where
incentives to create value are strongest, which is likely to be the last round as the deadline
effect suggests. However, the answers will also depend on how one defines “large” and
“small” issues in terms of their value technologies and perceptions of the negotiators.
7. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is done by constructing a MLSPE. Consider an n-round SPE with negotiation
efforts x1* (n), . . ., xn*(n). For τ = 1, . . ., n, let Sτ = ∑
τ
t=1 s(xt*(n), xt*(n)) denote the accumulated value, with S0 = 0.
Subgame perfection along the most lengthy and uninterrupted path requires that at each date τ < n the players set
ρτ = 1 and continue negotiations. Let Cτ(n) = δn–τ (Sn/2) – ∑n–1t–τ δt–1 x*t+1(n) denote the discounted continuation payoff
as viewed from the end of round τ. To have an n-round MLSPE, the continuation payoff Cτ(n) must exceed the
termination payoff Sτ/2 for each τ = 0, 1, . . ., n – 1. At each τ, there must exist a minimum discount factor δ_n(τ)
such that Cτ(n) > Sτ/2 for δ > δ_n(τ). This follows immediately from the fact that Cτ(n) is continuous and monotonically
increasing in δ, Cτ(n) → 0 as δ → 0, and Cτ(n) > Sτ/2 as δ → 1. Define δ_n = minτ=1, . . ., n–1δ_n (τ) as the minimum
discount factor such that continuation dominates termination in all rounds τ = 1, 2, . . ., n – 1.
The n-round SPE is a MLSPE if, given the value stock Sn accumulated at the end of round n, termination
dominates continuation to round n + 1: The latter option would increase the value stock by s(x*, x*) where x* is
the one-round Nash equilibrium effort that would be supplied in the last, n + 1’th round.18 The players will ter-
minate the process at the end of round n if
Sn     ≥ δ[Sn/2 + s(x*, x*)/2 – x*].2
Since s(x*, x*)/2 – x* > 0, this condition implies an upper bound on δ, denoted δ
–
n  ≡ δ
–
(n). Thus, the n-round SPE
is a MLSPE is δ ∈ δ_n δ
–
n].                                                                                   Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof constructs the equilibria mentioned in the proposition and verifies uniqueness
of undominated SPE by inspecting the strategy spaces. Because the rounds of the game consist of essentially a
repeated game (except that the created value S1 accumulates from round one to round two and the presence of a
discount factor), I concentrate on the equilibria of round one, leaving to the reader to use the same arguments
and fill in the details for equilibria of round two.
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First, consider case (i), c < δ L. Assume that
Note that M > X2 implies M > X1. Assume for the moment that the second-round strategies described in the propo-
sition form a Nash equilibrium, and consider the first-round strategies. A’s best reply in the first round can be
obtained from the payoff expression in (1) by varying P’s strategy µ1. Three intervals should be considered: [0,
1– c/δ L), [1 – c/δ L, L/[L + X1]) and [L/(L + X1), 1]. If µ1 belongs to the first or the second interval, direct accept-
ance is a strictly dominated action (by outright rejection), hence α1 = 0. In the second interval σ1 = 0 because µ1
> 1 – c/δ L implies that inspection is dominated by direct acceptance. Therefore A rejects with probability one if
µ1 lies in the second interval. For (large) µ1 in the third interval direct acceptance becomes the best option, thus,





 = 0 if µ
1
 = 0;
σ1 ≤ 1, α1 = 0 if µ1 ∈ [0, 1 – c/δ L);
σ1 = α1 = 0 if µ1 ∈ [1 – c/δ L, L/(L + X1));
σ
1
 = 0, α
1
 ∈ [0, 1] if µ
1
 = L/(L + X
1
);
α1 = 1 if µ1∈ (L/(L + X1), 1].
If P plays µ
1
 = 0, A’s best reply is clearly σ1* = α1* = 0. On the other hand, when A plays α = 0, P’s payoff can be
written as
    L                  c
      > 1 –        and M > X
2
. (6)
L + X1   δL







 (δ                – x
1
*), (7)
                          2
                   
 L                  c
M > X1 and             < 1 –        .
                  L + X1            δL
which shows that any µ1 ∈ [0, 1] is a best response of P to A’s strategy σ1 = 0. Thus, µ1* = 0 and σ1* = α1* = 0 are
best replies. For round two, one can similarly show that µ2* = σ2* = α2* = 0 is a Nash equilibrium when L/(L + X2)
>1 – c/L, as stated in the proposition.
To show that the combined strategies in round one and two form the unique SPE, I focus again on round one
and consider below alternative strategy configurations. Suppose there is a SPE in which µ1 ∈ [1 – c/δ L, 1]. A’s
best reply to such µ1 involves σ1 = 0. If σ1 = 0, P’s payoff given in (3) dictates that µ1 = 0 because M > X1, which
contradicts the assumption that µ1 ≥ 1 – c/δ L is an equilibrium strategy. Suppose now there is a SPE in which 0
< µ1 < 1 – c/δ L. As shown above, for such values of µ1 A’s best reply includes α1 = 0 and thus A’s payoff is as
given in (2) where σ1 may be positive. Note that P’s payoff, now given by (7), dictates µ1 = 1 for any σ1 > 0, a
contradiction. Uniqueness of round two Nash equilibrium described in the proposition can be established by using
the same procedure.
To construct a mixed-strategy equilibrium in the first round as described in case (i), suppose that
Assume that P’s strategy is µ1 = 1 – c/δ L. Then, A is indifferent between inspecting and accepting. Now, if µ1 =
1 – c/δ L > L/[L + X1] as assumed, outright rejection is strictly dominated by acceptance, hence any combination
α1 + σ1 = 1 is optimal for A. In particular, so is α1* = 1 – σ1 where σ1* = 1 – X1/M ∈ (0, 1). Inspecting P’s payoff
in (3) for α1 + σ1 = 1 reveals that such a σ1* must exist because M > X1. Given this σ1*, note that P is indifferent
between offering a sincere clause and a misleading clause. Thus, µ1* = [1 – c/δ L] ∈ (0, 1) is a best reply of P and
the strategies therefore constitute an equilibrium for the first round. Verifying the second-round equilibrium follows
similar arguments.
Proof of case (ii), where c ∈ [δ L, L], can be established by deriving the best reply correspondences as done
above for case (i). In case (iii), c > L, A finds that inspection is strictly dominated (by direct acceptance) in both
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rounds. Then, A never inspects: σ
t
 = 0 for t = 1, 2. A’s first-round best reply to µ
1
 is then α
1
 = 1 if µ
1
 > L/(L + X
1
),
α1 ∈ [0, 1] if µ1 = L/(L + X1), and α1 = 0 otherwise. P’s payoff is given in (3) where σ1 = 0, and his optimal
decision is µ1 = 1 if X1 > M and µ1 = 0 if X1 < M. The rest of the verification is straightforward. To establish unique-
ness it suffices to show that in each round there is no generic equilibrium in which A randomizes between direct
acceptance and rejection. Assume that the second-round play is as determined in the proposition and consider
the first-round strategies. Since σ1 = 0, A would choose α1 ∈ (0, 1) only if µ1 = L/(L + X1). But the expression of
U
P
 in (3) where σ
1
 = 0 reveals that the best reply µ
1




* = L/(L + X
1
) only if M = X
1
,
which is a zero probability event (of measure zero).                                                                                 Q.E.D.
Notes
1. For a detailed discussion of the fact that negotiation is not a zero-sum game and that efforts are necessary
to discover joint benefits, see Lax and Sebenius (1986) and Fisher and Ury (1981). A typical real-world
example used in illustrating this fact is the negotiation between Israel and Egypt over the Sinai (See Hopmann
(1996) for the details of the process leading to Camp David agreement).
2. The idea that negotiation involves both cooperation and competition is not new, recognized since long by
negotiation analysts. To distinguish between negotiations with a value-creation potential and (pure) bar-
gaining over a given value, several authors use “integrative bargaining” for the first, “distributive bargain-
ing” for the second. See Walton and McKersie (1965), Lax and Sebenius (1986), and Sebenius (1992) from
where we borrow the twin concepts of value creation and value claiming. Raiffa (1982) is a notable contri-
bution presenting formal negotiation models that focus on different issues.
3. The received theory of bargaining ignores the value creation process and focuses on the allocation of a
given value among a set of players. To our knowledge the only exceptions are Rasmussen (1994) and Frankel
(1998). Rasmussen presents a two-round negotiation model, from which we borrow in Section 5, with fixed
potential value and no discounting. Frankel studies some of the questions addressed below in variants of a
basic model which consists of a Rubinstein bargaining model preceded by a value creation effort by one of
the players.
4. In the basic model presented below, negotiation efforts in round t have no effect on productivity of nego-
tiation efforts in round s > t. Assuming a positive externality from round t to round s would obviously only
strengthen the deadline effect. This basic model is also related to dynamic models of private provision of
public goods. Bac (1996) studies a repeated game under incomplete information about private costs of
contributions, providing the conditions leading the game into a war of attrition where each player waits for
the other player to contribute. Admati and Perry (1991) study the pattern of contributions to a public good
or project of fixed size. The players in their model make alternating contributions. They show that contri-
butions may increase or decrease over time, depending on the discount factor.
5. In the contractor-client example, the contractor may opportunistically propose to negotiate inclusion of an
additional clause, knowing that the client (who ignores its full implications) will be dissatisfied ex-post if
he negotiates and accepts without closely inspecting the clause. Proposing to negotiate a set of issues with
the private knowledge that no agreement will follow can also be viewed as a misleading offer. This tactic
of “playing against time” is often used in international negotiations.
6. An alternative interpretation is that in each round the proposer offers a deal, which is the “raw material”
that has to be worked through in order to generate a joint value.
7. The main points stressed in this paper extend to the case of uncertain value technology.
8. This is consistent with the Nash bargaining solution and the subgame-perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein’s
(1982) alternating-offers bargaining game where the first offerer is selected at random, with equal prob-
ability. What matters is that the bargaining solution be known and anticipated before the players decide on
their value creating negotiation efforts. Qualitatively, the analysis goes through under any positive value-
sharing assumption.
9. The results hold under any convex effort disutility function. Linearity is assumed to simplify the algebra.
10. Hopmann (1996, pp. 215–217) also discusses this argument. See Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987) for an
alternating offers model of pure bargaining under incomplete information, generating a war-of-attrition
250 BAC
outcome. Another reason for intensified negotiation efforts and activities in late negotiation rounds stems
from the negotiation agenda. A commonly observed practice is that the parties often agree to tackle easy
issues first, followed by hard, effort- and time-consuming issues. Raiffa (1982, p. 178) analyzes the exam-
ple of Panama Canal negotiations where the parties have decided to follow an agenda, from easy issues to
harder ones, “in an effort to keep the course of negotiations smooth”. Hard issues demand relatively large
negotiation efforts to be solved, are often more important and promise a large joint value potential. The
Panamians, for instance, wanted to negotiate later the hard and important issue of compensation.
11. The game has other equilibria involving xit = 0, i = P, A, generating no value in round t. These equilibria
stem from Assumption 1, that individual negotiation effort are indispensable. However, there is a unique
SPE with positive value in each round. I focus on this equilibrium.
12. The deadline effect also extends to the case of an uncertain, recurrent value technology. To verify this in a
simple way one can include a possibility that the negotiation efforts will be unproductive, that is, generate
a value zero with probability p in each round. Negotiation efforts will again be increasing in time.
13. The fact that elements of value creation through sincere behavior and value claiming through misleading
behavior are simultaneously present generates a game which several authors have named “the negotiator’s
dilemma”. See Lax and Sebenius (1986) Ch. 2 for examples.
14. The timing of the loss L and the benefit M are consistent with the assumption that all benefits and costs,
except the costs of negotiation efforts, are incurred at the end of the process (the second round). Assuming
that L and M are incurred in the corresponding round does not have a qualitative impact on the results.
15. Contrary to Rasmussen (1994), the extended model endogenizes value creation efforts (conditional on that
a sincere offer is made) and allows for discounting, or breakdown of negotiations.
16. These equilibria are supported by rather strange beliefs. An example is, if P has proposed a sincere clause
and value has been created in the first round, A’s second-round strategy dictates to reject any offer, and P
in the second round responds with offering a misleading clause. This equilibrium, which is ruled out here,
is supported by the (fulfilled) belief that any sincere offer is followed in the second round by a misleading
offer. The analysis focuses on the most efficient SPE whenever there is an alternative equilibrium to the
one in which P proposes misleading offers in both rounds and A rejects.
17. The bargaining literature identifies several other factors shaping the agenda in negotiations. Bac (2000a,
b), Bac and Raff (1996) and Busch and Horstmann (1999) highlight the potential signaling function of the
agenda. Weinberger (2000) investigates efficiency properties of bargaining equilibria in a two-issue, alter-
nating-offers model. See also Inderst (2000) for a recent contribution.
18. Note that if the players deviate from the n-round SPE and decide to continue for another round and termi-
nate at round n + 1, they will choose noncooperatively their efforts x*t+1 = x* that solves maxx [s(x, x*)/2 –
x].
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